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LEVERAGING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACQUISITION 




Leveraging current and future International Cooperation opportunities, such as Foreign 
Military Sales and Cooperative Programs throughout the entire Department of Defense 
System Acquisition Framework could contribute to and enhance the systems acquired 
domestically and create additional Foreign Military Sales opportunities. Historically, 
International Cooperation is not considered in the acquisition process until sometime 
around initial operational capability or full operational capability. Considering 
International Cooperation earlier in the acquisition process may prove beneficial to the 
domestic side if Department of Defense systems can be developed and acquired to 
accommodate our foreign partner’s interoperability requirements and releaseability 
restrictions.  
The overall outcome of this study will be to identify the various entry points in 
the acquisition framework for International Cooperation and how that will benefit or 
deter the domestic program offices system acquisition efforts. Our research and analysis 
will focus on examples of various levels of effort that have been required to go back and 
retrofit a system to make it available to Foreign Military Sales and then identify where it 
could have been done more efficiently if considered earlier in the framework.  
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This chapter will describe the research and make the case for why leveraging 
international cooperation opportunities can potentially benefit Department of Defense 
(DOD) programs. The goal of the paper is to provide existing and future domestic 
Program Managers with information and processes that could help them fully consider 
international cooperation and the potential benefits to their domestic program as it relates 
to cost, schedule and performance. The paper will examine several United States Army 
(USA) and United States Navy (USN) programs and the cost/benefit of leveraging 
security cooperation opportunities, such as foreign military sales (FMS), and 
International Cooperative Programs (ICP) to contribute to and enhance the domestic 
systems they develop and/or acquire. The paper will only contain public release 
information and will be based primarily on a comparative analysis of domestic programs 
who have considered international cooperation early, middle, and late or not at all in their 
acquisition life cycles. An explanation will be provided regarding the scope of the 
research and how the research will be conducted. The thesis organization will also be 
explained to include background, problem identification, objectives, organization and 
expected accomplishments. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Leveraging current and future international cooperation opportunities, such as 
FMS and CP throughout the entire DOD System Acquisition Framework could contribute 
to and enhance the systems acquired domestically and create additional international 
cooperation opportunities. Title 10 USC. 2350a(e) and amended by Section 1251 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires an analysis of potential 
opportunities for international cooperation for all acquisition category (ACAT) I 
programs before the first milestone or decision point.1 Non-ACAT 1 programs however, 
are sometimes not considered for international cooperation in the acquisition process 
                                                 
1 Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), The Defense Acquisition System, DOD Directive 5000.1 
(Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2007). 
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until sometime around initial operational capability (IOC) or full operational capability 
(FOC). The objectives of international cooperation in Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (AT&L) emphasize operational, economic, technical, political, and industrial 
benefits to all stakeholders. Considering international cooperation earlier in the 
acquisition process may prove beneficial to the domestic side if DOD systems can be 
developed and acquired to accommodate our foreign partner’s interoperability 
requirements and releaseability restrictions. At any ACAT level, the key is applying the 
appropriate amount of international cooperation consideration as early as possible and not 
just checking the box on international cooperation consideration.  
As part of international cooperation, FMS provides the processes to conduct sales 
and transfers of services and equipment to foreign allies in support of interoperability. 
For FMS, Acquisition Managers take what has been developed for domestic use and 
tailor it for FMS or in some cases include FMS considerations within the development. 
Similarly, international cooperation is used to “reduce weapons system acquisition costs 
through cooperative development, production and support, foreign military sales and 
direct commercial sales in accordance with defense guidance.”2  
As stated by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Security Cooperation 
(SC) comprises all activities undertaken by the DOD and security establishments, 
including all DOD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense 
and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all 
international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and 
friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide 
U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.”3 U.S. Combatant 
Commands (COCOM) worldwide rely heavily on the defense capabilities of our allies to 
participate and interoperate effectively.  
                                                 
2 “International Cooperation in DOD Acquisition,” last modified September 5, 2014, 
http://acq.osd.mil/ic/Intl%20Coop%20in%DOD%20ACQ.html. 
3 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Electronic–Security Assistance Management Manual, DODD 
5105.38M (Arlington VA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2012). 
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FMS/CP are conduits to interoperability with our foreign allies. As DOD systems 
become fielded and deemed releasable, they are sold or transferred to certain foreign 
allies to facilitate the goals of international cooperation. Significant modifications as a 
result of releaseability, site/platform integration and affordability are often necessary to 
accommodate unique foreign requirements and/or export controls. Planning upfront for 
acquisitions in partnership with our foreign allies could benefit the DOD in numerous 
ways such as cooperative development, cost sharing, economies of scale and quicker 
implementation times for our allies. 
B. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS PLANNING 
The overall problem to be researched and analyzed is that a lack of consideration 
of foreign partner use or cooperative development by program offices (PO) that are 
developing and/or acquiring domestic military capabilities could result in missed 
opportunities for the PO. The informed foundation for this thesis will be primarily from 
DOD Instruction 5000.01 and use of USN and USA program of record (POR) program 
office research, combatant commander requirements and FMS/CP research. The Security 
Assistance Management Manual and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) will 
also be utilized as references. The analysis will utilize methods such as comparative and 
cost/benefit. Specific research questions, including required analysis to help solve this 
problem are identified as follows:  
Question 1 
 Can early and continuous consideration of foreign interoperability 
requirements within domestic DOD acquisitions benefit the United States 
Armed Forces acquisitions in terms of cost, schedule and performance?  
 Analysis Needed: Comparative and cost/benefit and risk analysis and 
SWOT 
 Research Needed: Examples of U.S. DOD domestic projects and programs 




Question 2  
 How does a domestic Program Office determine if foreign interoperability 
requirements exist for their product(s) and/or service(s)? 
 Analysis Needed: Determine FMS/CP processes as well as stakeholder 
considerations and expectations 
 Research Needed: Current U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy, 
COCOM missions/objectives; Specific foreign requests, alternative 
capability solutions 
Question 3 
 How does a domestic Program Office implement foreign interoperability 
requirements into their product(s) and/or service(s)? 
 Analysis Needed: Based on FMS/CP processes and stakeholder 
consideration determine what existing FMS/CP accommodations are in the 
DOD Acquisition framework. Also determine any gaps, detriments or 
barriers.  
 Research Needed: Specific references from DOD Instruction 5000.01 and 
the Security Assistance Management Manual 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this project will be as follows: 
 Identify the various entry and exit points in the acquisition framework for 
FMS/CP with an assessment of the opportunities & risks associated with 
earlier inclusion of the FMS/CP effort.  
 Identify risk/reward and opportunity/barriers to the domestic program 
offices system acquisition that could prevent international involvement or 
use.  
 Propose a process and/or entry points to assist domestic Project Managers 
in determining if FMS/CP can be leveraged to benefit their programs. 
 Provide an analysis of all FMS/CP stakeholders’ perspective in order to 
facilitate a comprehensive understanding of expectations through the 
process. 
 Conduct research and analysis with a focus on examples of various levels 
of effort that have been required to re-engineer and/or retrofit a system to 
make it available to FMS/CP. 
 Identify efficiency opportunities if FMS/CP is considered earlier in the 
framework.  
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D. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I of this research report outlines why this subject is important and 
presents the scope of the research conducted, initial background, problem identification, 
objectives and expected accomplishments. Chapter II will provide a comprehensive 
background on international cooperation including existing touch points within  
the DOD Acquisition framework. Chapter III will detail all stakeholder considerations 
and expectations. Chapter IV will provide specific examples and findings of 
programs/projects where early inclusion was considered and examples where retrofits 
and/or non-modifiable decisions were made. Chapter V will present conclusions and 
recommendations for potential process improvements and/or further research. 
E. EXPECTED ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
This project will provide an overview of international cooperation to include 
types of FMS and cooperative programs. Existing processes for program office 
consideration of foreign interoperability requirements will be explained and explored.  
 Process for international cooperation in AT&L and FMS consideration by 
program manager (PM) 
 Define stakeholder considerations and expectations 
 Specific examples of early inclusion 
 Specific examples of late inclusion resulting in FMS retrofit 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has set the foundation for exploring the utilization of U.S. 
interoperability requirements of our foreign allies in order to enhance, expand and 
potentially reduce the cost of our domestically acquired capabilities. This utilization may 
not only reduce the domestic acquisition burden through areas such as economies of scale 
and price reductions; it could also better equip our allies and render them more effective 
coalition partners and potentially assist with and international relations. We examine 
international cooperation and its placement in the overall Security Cooperation 
supporting U.S. National Security objectives in the next chapter. 
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II. DEFENSE ACQUISITION WITH INTERNATIONAL 
INVOLVEMENT  
A. OVERVIEW 
International Involvement as it relates to Defense Acquisition can be conducted 
through three types of programs; international armaments cooperation (IAC), foreign 
military sales (FMS), and direct commercial sales (DCS). Decisions made on every 
acquisition program throughout the entire acquisition life cycle can determine which, if 
any, of the programs is appropriate, or even possible. Defense Acquisition is a very 
complex business. While there are many factors that contribute to complexity, 
international involvement includes additional stakeholder consideration as well as the 
added technical complexity to meet international requirements for operation and 
releaseability. To most Program Managers, increased complexity translates to increased 
risk and uncertainty. The tendency is usually to reduce risk, eliminate uncertainty, 
increase direct control and as a result, improve the potential for program success. 
Following this tendency may result in missed opportunities for realizing the potential 
benefits that international involvement can bring to our National Defense. Program 
Management Teams, to be effective in this area, need a great deal of knowledge and 
assistance in order to navigate the complex intertwining of Defense Acquisition and 
International involvement. This chapter provides an overview of the International 
programs and lays a foundation for understanding the multiple opportunities that exist 
when considering them from a Defense Acquisition perspective. 
B. DRILLING DOWN, PROGRAMS DEFINED 
To better understand the three basic programs mentioned above; FMS, DCS and 
IAC, we will start at the top level and then drill down. At the National level, there are two 
categories of international programs, security assistance (SA) and security cooperation 
(SC).  
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1. Security Assistance 
As per the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) the following 
definition of Security Assistance is provided:  
SA is a group of programs, authorized under Title 22 authorities, by which 
the United States provides defense articles, military education and 
training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash 
sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. All SA 
programs are subject to the continuous supervision and general direction 
of the Secretary of State to best serve U.S. foreign policy interests; 
however, programs are variously administered by DOD or Department of 
State (DOS). Those SA programs that are administered by DOD become a 
subset of SC.4  
2. Security Cooperation 
As per the SAMM the following definition of Security Cooperation is provided:  
SC comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense 
(DOD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the 
United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD 
interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all 
DOD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense 
and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, 
including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA 
activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense 
and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and 
contingency access to host nations. It is DOD policy that SC is an 
important tool of national security and foreign policy and is an integral 
element of the DOD mission. SC activities shall be planned, programmed, 
budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and 
efficiency as other integral DOD activities. SC requirements shall be 
combined with other DOD requirements and implemented through 
standard DOD systems, facilities, and procedures. See DODD 5132.03.5  
 
The key differences between SA and SC are in the authorization, appropriation, 
and governing legal statutes for each. SA is authorized under Title 22 and SC is under 
                                                 
4 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Electronic–Security Assistance Management Manual, DODD 
5105.38M (Arlington VA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2012). 
5 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Electronic–Security Assistance Management Manual, DODD 
5105.38M (Arlington VA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2012). 
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Title 10, being authorized under the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation 
Acts. All Security Assistance Programs executed by the DOD become Security 
Cooperation Programs. See Table 3 in the Appendix for a full listing of SP programs and 
Table 4 in the Appendix for a full listing of SC programs with brief descriptions of all. 
C. DEFENSE ACQUISITION INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS 
Drilling down another level by filtering out the programs in tables 3 and 4 that are 
not associated with military equipment and/or material development, the three previously 
mentioned programs remain valid considerations for Acquisition Program Managers; 
FMS, DCS and IAC. All three of these programs seek to enhance U.S. national security, 
but do so through different methods. While FMS and DCS programs predominately 
involve the sale of various defense systems that the DOD has already developed and 
deployed to its own forces, IAC predominantly focuses on interfacing with international 
partners during the research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) and 
production phases of the U.S. systems acquisition process. 
Foreign Military Sales  
Commonly known as simply FMS, is the purchase of U.S. Defense articles, 
services and training by eligible foreign governments from the U.S. government. 
Direct Commercial Sales  
Referred to as DCS is the purchase of U.S. Defense articles by eligible Foreign 
Governments from the U.S. Manufacturing Contractor, with an approved export license 
issued by DOS and approved by Congress. 
International Armaments Cooperation  
Also known as International Cooperation in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
(DAG) is defined as: 
Any acquisition program or technology project that includes participation 
by one or more foreign nations, through an international agreement, during 
any phase of a system’s life cycle. The key objectives of international 
cooperative programs are to reduce weapons system acquisition costs 
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through cooperative development, production, and support; and to enhance 
interoperability with coalition partners.6  
D. INTERNATIONAL ARMAMENTS COOPERATION PROJECTS 
IAC has several sub-efforts, or projects that span the entire defense acquisition 
system (DAS) as described below.  
1. International Forums 
To support early understanding of mutual needs, capabilities and technology with 
potential International Cooperating Partner Nations, engineers, researchers and managers 
should participate in the appropriate International Forums. There are several, including 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Science and Technology Organization and 
over thirty bilateral forums with countries across the globe. Continued participation in 
forums, throughout a systems development life cycle can facilitate the sharing of 
knowledge, best practices and lessons learned, while also contributing to the 
harmonization of standards and requirements. 
2. Studies 
Early acquisition efforts that have potential International interest would benefit 
from the conduct of studies to assess critical areas. These areas include feasibility, 
availability, technology maturity, potential requirements/capability gaps and support the 
Analysis of Alternatives prior to a system entering Milestone A. Studies can be 
conducted by industry, government or a combination of both. 
3. RDT&E Information Exchange Program 
This is the exchange of technical data with other countries to further the RDT&E 
effort of a U.S. weapons system. This program has the potential to reduce the time and 
cost of developing a system. There generally must be an actual, or established, U.S. 
requirement that the exchange of data supports. 
                                                 
6 Defense Acquisition University, Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG), online version, 
https://dag.dau.mil/Pages/Default.aspx, September 2014. 
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4. Engineers and Scientists Exchange Program 
The mutual exchange of military or civilian engineers and scientists, typically in a 
permanent change of station arrangement, for the purpose of becoming producing 
members of the host nation military RDT&E community can benefit both countries 
involved in the exchange. This facilitates a better understanding of the other nation’s 
technologies and capabilities while allowing an engineer or scientist to contribute as a 
member of the assigned nations RDT&E community and potentially provide career 
enhancement within the parent organization. 
5. Test and Evaluation Program 
Test and Evaluation Program (TEP) agreements establish cooperative and 
reciprocal test and evaluation activities. This includes cooperative testing, evaluation and 
can also include Reciprocal Use of Test Facilities (RUTF) agreements. Interoperability 
assessment can be enhanced with earlier, less costly identification of problems and more 
affordable testing of solutions. Sharing of resources and data can increase mission 
capability for the U.S. and our allies. 
6. Foreign Comparative Testing  
In a Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) effort, the U.S. can test and evaluate 
foreign weapons systems or components to identify the potential to fill a U.S. military 
requirement or overcome an operational gap with a reduction in cost and schedule of a 
potential system fielding. FCT also facilitates interoperability and standardization with 
our allies. 
7. Cooperative Research, Development, and Production 
Spanning a very large spectrum of the DAS, these bilateral or multilateral 
agreements are for the cost-sharing of research, development and production of a system. 
The most prominent example of this in the 21st century is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
which has foreign cooperative partners including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia 
and several others. Opportunities can also exist for a much smaller and far less 
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intimidating cooperative effort which may only span the development and/or production 
of a system, or product improvement, as compared to the entire system life cycle. 
8. No Cost Equipment Loans for RDT&E 
In this effort, the U.S. can loan defense equipment to other countries to support 
their RDT&E programs but with the requirement that the test results are provided back to 
the U.S... An interesting caveat here is that loaned equipment could be expended, for 
example, during live fire testing or other destructive tests, without reimbursement. 
E. SUMMARY 
FMS and DCS are the most widely recognized foreign partner acquisition 
methods, but real benefit can be gained from using the full spectrum of international 
programs including IAC with the appropriate projects identified above. Proper 
consideration should be given at every decision point along the DAS for the appropriate 
level of international involvement based on a fully informed cost/benefit analysis. 
Additional Stakeholders always bring potential for added schedule risk, pressure for 
requirements creep, and the likely scenario of simultaneous cost increase and cost risk. 
The potential upside though is leveraging international efforts for a stronger, more 
effective war fighting coalition that can seamlessly operate and communicate. 
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III. STAKEHOLDERS 
A. INTRODUCTION TO FMS/CP STAKEHOLDERS 
Stakeholders are individuals and groups who influence, are impacted by or have 
an interest in FMS/CP. This chapter will provide a description of FMS/CP stakeholders 
and their organizations in order to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of their 
expectations through the acquisition process. For each stakeholder identified, a 
description of their role will be provided. In addition, each stakeholder’s perspective will 
be examined in order to understand their expectations throughout the acquisition process. 
Finally, an interface diagram will be presented to show the relationships and 
dependencies amongst all the stakeholders. For the purposes of this research paper, the 
stakeholders covered are U.S. Navy- and U.S. Army-centric and will fall in nine (9)  
focus areas, as identified in Table 1. 
Table 1.   FMS/CP Stakeholder Identification 
Stakeholder 
Group 
Description Stakeholder Organization 
Governance “Chain of Command”  
Policy/Strategy 
Decision authority for 
Program Offices  
Export 
Congress 
Department of Defense 
Department of State 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) 
Research, Development & Acquisition (RDA)  
Deputy ASN International Programs 
(IP)/Navy international program office(NIPO) 
United States Army Security Assistance 
Command (USASAC) 






foreign military sales 
Authority for what 
products/ capabilities can 
be exported 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
(DSCA) 
Navy International Program Office (NIPO) 
United States Army Security Assistance 
Command (USASAC) 





operations in their area of 
responsibility 
Based on military strategies 







Description Stakeholder Organization 
and cooperation plans, 
establishes requirements 
for foreign nation 
capabilities 
Equips and trains non-









Non-U.S. nations that 
procure and use U.S. 
military products and 
systems or receive training 
and other support 




In-Country Team based at 
U.S. embassies 
Security Cooperation Organizations, to 
include Department of State and DOD 
personnel at U.S. embassies 
System 
Commands 
Supports Program Offices 
through their functional 
competencies, contracts  
Technical points of contact 
on programs 




Technology Transfer Office (TTO)/ 





Manages the acquisition, 
deployment and support of 
the technology products 
and systems 
Technical experts 
program manager warfare (PMW) 
program manager ships (PMS) 
program manager air (PMA) 
Other 
Commands 
Acquire and support 
systems for the fleet 
Manage foreign sales for 
their platforms 
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) 
weapon systems support (WSS) 
U.S. Army communications-electronic 
command (CECOM) 
U.S. Army PEO Missile & Space  
Naval Education and Training Security 
Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA)  
Defense Information System Agency (DISA) 
Executing 
Activities 
Product and service 
providers 
Army and Navy Working Capital Fund 
Organizations 
Industry Contractors and Sub Contractors 





Those stakeholders that fall into the Governance category represent the top of the 
Chain of Command. Comprised of several layers, they are the decision authorities over 
acquisition including FMS/CP. With varying breadths of reach and influence as well as 
differing purposes, the objectives of the organizations at governance level are all closely 
related. They strive to legitimately implement, ensure and regulate the acquisition process 
throughout the highest levels of government down to the commands in the most efficient 
manner possible. Minimizing total ownership cost, rapidly fielding capabilities and 
developing their workforces are examples of their strategic goals. Throughout the DOD 
acquisition framework, the stakeholders in charge of governance are the overarching 
leaders of the process and their influence is prevalent at every stage. 
C. POLICY MAKERS 
The Policy Makers establish and define the rules which all DOD acquisition 
participants must follow. They establish policies impacting security assistance including 
FMS/CP and are the authority for which products/capabilities can be exported. 
Organizations such as DSCA, Navy IPO and the National Security Agency are 
responsible for ensuring that sales to our foreign partners are always in the interest of the 
U.S. government (USG) and compliant with established release and disclosure 
guidelines. From the foreign partner request to the official USG response through 
completion, they are accountable for ensuring sales are executed in compliance with 
statute and regulation. Policy Maker stakeholders are also very much involved in the 
entire DOD acquisition framework since they are involved at every stage in the life cycle 
of any given sale. 
D. USG CUSTOMERS 
USG Customers represent a major driving force in security assistance. It is from 
these stakeholders that the majority of the interoperability and capability requirements for 
our foreign partners are established. Unified Combatant Commands (UCC)/(COCOMS) 
such as central command (CENTCOM) and Europe Command (EUCOM) and other 
regional COCOMs as well as their Naval component commands and Fleet Commanders 
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make up this group of stakeholders. Their main mission is to conduct military operations 
in their area of responsibility based on military strategies and cooperation plans. In 
domestic DOD acquisition, they are the customer and end user. They also, however, 
establish requirements for foreign nation capabilities and equip and train non-traditional 
foreign partners as part of their mission. They do this with a focus on achieving the 
strategies articulated in the Theater Security Cooperation Plans and the required mission. 
The military commands at this level are interested in receiving authorized and released 
products/capabilities that support their strategy, that work, and can be fielded quickly. 
They also help coordinate, communicate and endorse what countries are asking for and 
what requirements are being requested. Within the DOD acquisition framework the USG 
customers identify requirements and constantly want to understand what’s available and 
what’s in the pipeline and at the same time understand the laws and processes within 
security assistance in order to execute the mission. 
E. EMBASSY TEAMS 
Closely related to our USG Customers, another type of USG stakeholder exists 
within each foreign partner’s nation. Usually, based out of, or affiliated with, the U.S. 
Embassy, these in-country teams are called Security Cooperation Organizations that can 
include Department of State and Defense Department personnel. Their interests include 
understanding the requirements and solution alternatives for military capabilities and 
endorsing and having awareness of foreign requests for capability as well as end use 
monitoring. Their influence in the DOD acquisition cycle is mostly in the beginning prior 
to Milestone A when user needs are being determined and aligning them with technology 
opportunities and resources.  
F. FOREIGN CUSTOMER 
Our Foreign Customer stakeholders represent the Non-U.S. nations that procure 
and use U.S. military products and systems or receive training and other support. They 
are in addition to the traditional USG customer in DOD acquisition. Made up of coalition 
partners and other foreign, sometimes non-traditional governments, this stakeholder is the 
end user within FMS/CP. Their interests range from self-defense, counter-terrorism, anti-
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piracy, border control, protecting natural resources and humanitarian missions. They have 
a desire to obtain interoperable systems to effectively operate and communicate with 
U.S., themselves and other partners. Just as most customers, they are very conscious of 
their budgets and schedules and how they are managed in order to obtain the capabilities 
they require. In some cases they only require a better understanding of the basic concepts 
of the military capabilities available to them. From the DOD acquisition framework 
perspective, foreign customers traditionally have not had much influence throughout the 
phases due to a lack of early consideration. 
G. SYSTEMS COMMANDS 
System Commands  are the major capability aligned acquisition commands. Their main 
focus is to support the Program Offices through their functional competencies. They 
provide resources to programs, establish common practices and provide qualified 
personal to the Program Offices who represent competencies such as comptroller, 
contracts, engineering, counsel, human resources, program management, technology 
transfer (disclosure) and security cooperation. 
H. PROGRAM OFFICES 
Program Offices manage the acquisition, deployment and support of technology 
products and systems. They contain the technical experts who are experienced with the 
development of the capabilities and/or the integration into military platforms or sites. 
With regard to FMS/CP, the Program Offices either assign personnel directly to support 
FMS/CP or may be entirely dedicated to providing FMS and coordinate with 
system/platform Program Offices to identify and deliver capability.  
I. EXECUTING ACTIVITIES 
In direct support to the Program Offices are the Executing Activities stakeholders. 
They are the product and service providers that the Program Offices enter into USG-to- 
USG agreements with such as Army and Navy working capital funds (WCF) engineering 
centers, contracts with industry and sometimes Federally Funded Research and 
Development Centers (FFRDC). From the USG Systems Center and FFRDC perspective, 
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their goal is to efficiently and effectively provide technical services and capabilities to the 
fleet while covering their operating costs. From Industry’s perspective their goal is 
mainly to operate a successful business in support of the USG acquisition objectives.  
J. OTHER COMMANDS 
Finally, stakeholders also exist at Other Commands outside of the traditional 
Systems Commands. These Other Commands can vary in what they provide and/or 
support for the fleet. In some cases they may also manage foreign sales for their 
platforms/capabilities. Several examples include Naval Supply Systems Command 
Weapon Systems Support (NAVSUP WSS), U.S. Army communications-electronic 
command (CECOM) U.S. Army PEO Missile & Space, Naval Education and Training 
Security Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA) and Defense Information System Agency 
(DISA). The significance of this group is that in many areas they hold the key to 
providing an end-to-end solution or service. 
K. STAKEHOLDER SUMMARY 
Figure 1 is provided as a high level interface diagram from the perspective of the 
FMS/CP community. The figure shows the breadth of stakeholder involvement and with 
the exception of a few, the stakeholder groups should look familiar to the domestic 
Program Office. This chapter’s focus was on identifying the multiple stakeholders who 
influence, are impacted by or have an interest in FMS/CP during the life cycle of a 
domestic product and/or service. Descriptions were provided to explain the unique 
entities within the various stakeholder levels as well as their expectations in order to gain 
an understanding of the players in the FMS/CP arena. Of importance in this chapter was 
the element that the foreign partner is in addition to the traditional USG customer in 
DOD acquisition.  
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Figure 1.  FMS/CP Stakeholders 
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IV. PROGRAM EXAMPLES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The following sections provide specific U.S. DOD acquisition program examples 
where international consideration was done early, middle, late or not at all in their 
acquisition life cycles. Programs from both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army are examined 
and include platforms, systems and individual capabilities. The data presented includes 
program description, international involvement and then strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis of cost, schedule and performance relative to 
the program’s level of international involvement. 
B. GLOBAL COMMAND & CONTROL SYSTEM–JOINT  
1. Program Description 
The Global Command & Control System–Joint (GCCS-J) is a DOD major 
information technology (IT) investment and designated as an ACAT 1AC Major 
Automated Information System (MAIS) Special Interest program developed by the 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).7 DISA is a DOD Combat Support Agency 
that provides, operates, and assures command and control (C2), information sharing 
capabilities, and a globally accessible enterprise information infrastructure in direct 
support to joint Warfighters, National level leaders, and other mission and coalition 
partners across the full spectrum of operations.8 
2. System Description 
GCCS-J provides “vital connectivity to systems used to plan, execute and manage 
military operations for both joint and multinational operations. The GCCS-J service fuses 
select C2 capabilities into a comprehensive, interoperable system by exchanging imagery, 
intelligence, status of forces, and planning information.” GCCS-J is a command, control, 
                                                 
7 “GCCS-J Program Control Acquisition Management Support Services,” last modified October 21, 
2009 https://www.fbo.gov. 
8 “GCCS-Joint,” accessed on September 15, 2014, http://www.disa.mil/Services/Command-and-
Control/GCCS-J. 
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communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) system for achieving full spectrum 
dominance, consisting of hardware, software, procedures, standards, and interfaces that 
provide a C2 capability to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Secretary of Defense 
(SeCDeF), National Military Command Center (NMCC), combatant commanders 
(CDRs), joint force commanders, and service component commanders. It is a suite of 
mission applications fusing select capabilities into a comprehensive, interoperable system 
by exchanging imagery, intelligence, status of forces, and planning information. GCCS-J 
is the principal foundation for dominant battle space awareness, providing an integrated, 
near real-time picture of the battle space necessary to conduct joint and multinational 
operations. It offers vital connectivity to the systems the joint warfighter uses to plan, 
execute, and manage military operations.”9 
GCCS-J is a full spectrum C2 system capable of supporting joint and 
multinational operations. GCCS-J is also the foundation for other variants developed and 
used by the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard. These variants, based on 
GCCS-J, include capabilities that are specific to the individual services and their 
missions.  
3. GCCS-J International Involvement  
GCCS-J is an example of a program where international consideration was 
included early in its acquisition life cycle. As indicated above, DISA considers coalition 
partners and multinational operations in the scope of requirements satisfied by GCCS-J. 
As per Mr. Robert Randle of DISA GCCS-J PO in 2009, “GCCS-J is a critical partner in 
Allied and Coalition Operations and places emphasis toward that during development.” 
International users include NATO, Canada, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, France and the 
Czech Republic to name a few. As with most international applications, tailoring for 
scalability and releaseability varies depending on the partner. DISA will either make 
these modifications or allow other DOD POs to use a releasable baseline to integrate the 
                                                 
9 “GCCS-Joint,” accessed on September 15, 2014, http://www.disa.mil/Services/Command-and-
Control/GCCS-J. 
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scalability. In both instances, DISA provides support of the product to the international 
customer and/or the integrating PO. 
4. SWOT 
Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as they pertain to the GCCS-J 
PO’s level of international consideration in the areas of cost, schedule and performance 
are as follows: 
 Strengths: 
 Cost: Able to use both domestic and international funding to 
support the product as a whole.  
 Schedule: Able to abbreviate delivery schedules by exploiting 
initial baseline(s) and scaling from there as opposed to developing 
from the ground up 
 Performance: Able to accommodate both domestic and 
international C4ISR requirements  
 Weaknesses: 
 Cost: Higher operating costs to support international components 
 Schedule: Multiple schedules increase multiple opportunities for 
schedule risks 
 Performance: Limited interoperability testing opportunities as a 
result of coordination complexity 
 Opportunities: 
 Cost: Diversifies system to meet changing and competing domestic 
and international requirements 
 Schedule: Able to potentially shorten future delivery timeframes 
by developing fewer baselines for multiple customers 
 Performance: Era of expanding coalition involvement and increase 
U.S. reliance on allies provides more opportunities to meet and use 
international capability requirements 
 Threats: 
 Cost: Investment in international requirements could be wasted if 
international interests decline or radically change 
 Schedule: Delivery schedules could be jeopardized if domestic and 
international requirements compete with each other for the same 
resources  
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 Performance: Information assurance across a broader spectrum of 
customers could open up system vulnerabilities 
C. GLOBAL COMMAND & CONTROL SYSTEM–MARITIME (GCCS-M) 
1. Program Description 
GCCS-M is based on GCCS-J and is the USN variant that adds specific naval 
functionality and scalability to support its command structure across numerous platform 
type, sizes and missions. “GCCS-M provides maritime commanders at all echelons with a 
single, integrated, and scalable C2 system. GCCS-M fuses, correlates, filters, maintains, 
and displays location and attribute information on friendly, hostile, and neutral land, sea, 
and air forces, and integrates this data with available intelligence and environmental 
information to support command decisions.”10 
2. GCCS-M International Involvement 
GCCS-M is an example of a program where international consideration was not 
included, but deferred, in its acquisition life cycle. One of the GCCS-M missions is 
maritime coalition interoperability. As a result of this, GCCS-M can be tailored and 
released to individual coalition partners to fulfill this mission requirement. The 
requirement for a specific coalition partner to obtain the GCCS-M capability, in most 
cases, stems from the COCOM interoperability requirement for that specific nation’s 
navy.  
To satisfy this requirement, the request from the foreign partner, with the 
COCOM endorsement is submitted to DSCA and forwarded to NIPO for tasking. PEO 
C4I’s international C4I integration PO (PMW 740) provides a “Quick look” back to 
NIPO, vetting the request for pricing and availability to the GCCS-M PO and for 
disclosure to the Systems Command’s security office. An “offer” is prepared and 
submitted through NIPO and DSCA to the purchasing nation for acceptance and 
implementation. Once implemented, funds are made available and PMW 740 can begin 
                                                 




the task of procuring, developing, integrating, testing, installing, training and supporting 
the GCCS-M implementation for the purchasing nation. 
Another possible way to satisfy the foreign partner’s request is for PEO C4I to 
route the request to their Navy Command and Control PO (PMW 150) which is the PO 
responsible for GCCS-M. However, In order to meet this maritime coalition 
interoperability requirement, the GCCS-M PO allows other entities, within their 
SYSCOM, to build integrate and release individual builds for specific coalition partners. 
The GCCS-M PO, therefore, has focused its efforts on the task of building and releasing 
its own three (3) USN command structure builds. As a result, the GCCS-M PO limits its 
international consideration to the disclosure level and relies on PMW 740 to deliver the 
requested capability to the purchasing nation. 
3. SWOT 
Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as they pertain to the GCCS-M 
PO’s level of international consideration in the areas of cost, schedule and performance 
are as follows: 
 Strengths: 
 Cost: Lowers operating costs by limiting the number of customers  
 Schedule: Single customer focus limits schedule permutations 
 Performance: Disclosure Authority responsible for determining 
final baseline of capabilities based on releaseability 
 Weaknesses: 
 Cost: Resources from international involvement cannot be 
leveraged to potentially benefit domestic development 
 Schedule: International customer pressure on domestic release 
schedules  
 Performance: Limited or no influence on system integration efforts 
for international customers on their own system baseline 
 Opportunities: 
 Cost: Domestic focus should increase probability of being within 
budget 
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 Schedule: Domestic focus should increase probability of being on 
time 
 Performance: Limits complexity in an already complex capabilities 
set 
 Threats: 
 Cost; Lack of international consideration removes opportunities 
that could sustain the PO during a period of DOD reductions  
 Schedule: Challenges to meeting the demanding domestic 
schedules could cause international partners to look to other C4ISR 
products 
 Performance: Narrowly focusing on a single customer excludes 
consideration of information assurance (IA) postures/ 
vulnerabilities and information sharing challenges in the 
international arena  
D. FIGHTER/ATTACK (F/A)-18 
1. Program Description 
The F/A-18 entered testing in 1979 and operational service in 1983 with the U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps and is still in operation as of the date of this paper. Numerous 
variants in the platform were developed to support 1 and 2 seat configurations, multiple 
mission packages and upgrades. The F/A-18 is described as follows: 
The McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) F/A-18 Hornet is a twin-engine 
supersonic, all-weather carrier-capable multirole combat jet, designed as 
both a fighter and attack aircraft (F/A designation for fighter/attack). 
Designed by McDonnell Douglas and Northrop, the F/A-18 was derived 
from the latter’s YF-17 in the 1970s for use by the United States Navy and 
Marine Corps. The Hornet is also used by the air forces of several other 
nations. The U.S. Navy’s Flight Demonstration Squadron, the Blue 
Angels, has used the Hornet since 1986.11  
 Back in the early 1970s, the original requirement for the F/A-18 stemmed from 
the need for a multirole aircraft to replace the A-4, A-7 and F-4 platforms as well as to 
work in conjunction with the F-14. During this same period, numerous industry partners 
such as McDonnell Douglas, Northrop and General Dynamics participated in U.S. Air 
                                                 
11 Wikipedia, s.v. “F/A-18,” last modified September 12, 2014. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDONnell_Douglas_F/A-18_Hornet  
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Force (USAF) competitions for a new airframe. The U.S. Navy, not satisfied with the 
USAF competition results, requested that McDonnell Douglas and Northrop together 
come up with a new design. Both companies worked together and came up with the 
original F-18 platform sharing the component manufacturing efforts. McDonnell Douglas 
became the prime for the naval versions and Northrop became the prime for what was 
hoped to be an exportable version.12  
2. F/A-18 International Involvement 
F/A-18 is an example of a program where international consideration was not a 
driving force at the beginning but was included later in its acquisition life cycle at least 
by the U.S. Navy. Industry, however attempted to consider it early. The exportable 
version, called the F-18L did not take hold with the international community and never 
went into mass production. McDonnell Douglas continued to work with the U.S. Navy 
and through FMS sales (except for Canada which was DCS) delivered variants to the 
Royal Australian Air Force (1984), Canada (1982), Finland (1995), Kuwait (1991), 
Malaysia (1997) Spain (1985), and Switzerland (1996).13 
In large weapons systems acquisitions such as the F/A-18 it is common for 
Industry to own the export and design rights such as McDonnell Douglas did after buying 
Northrop out of the rights for the F-18L. Owning these rights allows the company to 
essentially market the platform to foreign countries that can be exported to as deemed by 
the Department of State. DCS and FMS are both options but in the case of the F/A-18 the 
majority of international sales were done via FMS. The international sales revenues to the 
seven (7) countries that purchased F/A-18s was over $7 billion which ultimately reduced 
the cost of new aircraft to the U.S..14 
                                                 
12 Wikipedia, s.v. “F/A-18,” last modified September 12, 2014. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDONnell_Douglas_F/A-18_Hornet 
13 Wikipedia, s.v. “F/A-18,” last modified September 12, 2014. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDONnell_Douglas_F/A-18_Hornet 




Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as they pertain to the F/A-18 
program’s level of international consideration in the areas of cost, schedule and 
performance are as follows: 
 Strengths: 
 Cost: Cost of new aircraft to U.S. was reduced as a result of 
international sales  
 Schedule: Able to maintain aggressive delivery schedules by 
exploiting a single baseline design and adding variants on top 
 Performance: Additional resources from international sales 
allowed multiple variants whose innovations benefited all 
customers 
 Weaknesses: 
 Cost: Higher number of engineering and support elements and 
associated operating costs to support international configurations 
 Schedule: Multiple schedules increase multiple opportunities to 
miss 
 Performance: Competing domestic and international requirements 
could result in undesirable tradeoffs for stakeholders 
 Opportunities: 
 Cost: Diversification of platform to meet domestic and 
international requirements which could keep industry partner 
production lines open as the demands of each customer base 
change 
 Schedule: Potential ability to align schedules of both customer 
bases 
 Performance: Increased interoperability and support infrastructure 
with allies 
 Threats: 
 Cost: Investment in international requirements could be wasted if 
international interests decline or radically change 
 Schedule: Delivery schedules could be jeopardized if domestic and 
international demands conflict or compete  
 Performance: Releaseability and/or export restrictions could limit 
platform capabilities and potentially force re-design if not fully 
considered before entering into agreements 
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E. AIR TRAFFIC NAVIGATION, INTEGRATION, AND COORDINATION 
SYSTEM (ATNAVICS) 
1. System Description 
ATNAVICS provides air traffic services (ATS) at terminal airfields, landing sites 
or zones within the division, corps and echelons above corps (EAC) areas of operation. 
The controller stations and communication equipment are installed in an S–788 shelter 
which is typically mounted on the prime mover, a high mobility multipurpose wheeled 
vehicle, (HMMWV). ATNAVICS includes the following subsystems: secure voice 
communications package; airport surveillance radar (ASR); precision approach radar 
(PAR); secondary surveillance radar/identify friend or foe (SSR/IFF); two multimode 
display units; self–contained environmental control equipment; power generation 
equipment and required spares and support equipment. The capability of being air 
transportable with roll–on/roll–off capability on a C–130 or larger aircraft allows the 
ATNAVICS system to be rapidly deployed and functional world-wide. The complete 
deployable package includes the operation shelter, the sensor equipment 
(ASR/PAR/SSR/IFF), generators, trailers, personal gear for technicians, placement and 
setup equipment, cables and other ancillary equipment. 
2. Program Description 
ATNAVICS is an Army and Marine Corps ACAT III program that was acquired 
as a non-developmental item (NDI) to replace the AN/TSQ-71 system, which includes 
the AN/TPN-18, a tactical PAR system. The AN/TPN-18 was bulky, required excessive 
time to install, and was extremely difficult to maintain due to its outdated technology 
components. The ATNAVICS requirement was officially documented in an operational 
requirements document (ORD), dated 29 November 1992, updated and re-validated on  
10 September 1999. 
A competitive cost plus incentive fee contract was awarded to Raytheon in 1995 
to conduct engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) for the ATNAVICS. 
After contract modifications, cost overruns and delays, the contract was modified in  
1998 to complete the EMD effort and capped at $26.1M. One prototype system was built 
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with developmental testing and operational testing (DT/OT) conducted at FT Huachuca 
and FT Campbell in fiscal year 1999 (FY99). Through March 2005, the government 
exercised hardware options to procure twenty-four ATNAVICSs (two of which were 
funded by and are for the Marine Corps). Production was completed in fiscal year (FY) 
13 with a total of fifty-four ATNAVICSs produced, thirty-nine for the Army and fifteen 
for the Marine Corps. 
3. International Involvement 
Air Traffic Control provided by the ATNAVICS is international in capability and 
interoperability by its nature. The international interoperability is achieved through the 
choice of radios, power requirements, and IFF equipment (TPX-56) as well as flexibility 
in assignment of radar frequencies and was considered in the earliest requirements for 
ATNAVICS. The ATNAVICS has a data network connection to the TAIS using the 
international ASTERIX standard for radar data which allows for potential porting of 
information to international partners. 
There have been no significant issues identified with international capability or 
interoperability of the system in use by the Army or Marine Corps. However, as a result 
of the NDI effort, re-use of government furnished equipment established the 
technological foundation for the ATNAVICS. Transmit/receive modules (TRM) used in 
the PAR portion of the system came from, and are still used in, the THAAD Radar 
system. These subsystems/component and are export controlled. For the foreseeable 
future, the Army and Marine Corps will be restricted from FMS agreements and 
Raytheon will be unable to execute DCS agreements. Developmental cost and schedule 
was gained at the expense of system exportability. 
Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as they pertain to the 
ATNAVICS level of international consideration in the areas of cost, schedule and 





 Cost: Potentially allow for increased quantity buys and reduced 
individual system costs. Potential for increased competition may 
decrease overall development, procurement and sustainment costs 
 Schedule: None 
 Performance: None. It is assumed that there were no existing TMR 
technologies available from international sources 
 Weaknesses: 
 Cost: International involvement excludes the opportunity for NDI 
of critical subsystems. Developmental costs of technology to meet 
the performance requirements would be significantly increased 
 Schedule: International involvement increases the EMD schedule 
significantly 
 Performance: Holding with the assumption that no technology is 
available from international sources, performance sacrifices would 
need to be made for the allowance of international participation 
 Opportunities: 
 Cost: Potential capability and technology insertion could be cost 
shared with foreign governments which would reduce the future 
cost of upgrades 
 Schedule: International purchases could provide opportunities for 
schedule flexibility by allowing to better manage long term 
production rates 
 Performance: None 
 Threats: 
 Cost: International involvement increases cost estimates for 
development and production and simultaneously adds cost risk to 
the program 
 Schedule: Significantly increased schedule would almost certainly 
be a result of international involvement 
 Performance: Some, if not significant, reduction on developed 
performance would be anticipated with international involvement 
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F. APACHE ATTACK HELICOPTER (AH-64) 
1. System Description 
The Apache is the U.S. Army’s primary attack helicopter. Entering into service in 
1982 and currently being built by Boeing in Mesa Arizona, it is now fielded in its third 
Type designation known as the AH-64E Apache Guardian15. Replacing the AH-1 Cobra, 
which had been the primary U.S. Army Attack Helicopter since the Vietnam War, the 
Apache maintains the tandem seating configuration of the Cobra but incorporates a twin 
engine driven, four bladed design with tail/main wheel type landing gear. The Apache 
brings many capability improvements to the battle over previous systems such as; 
improved weapons systems, improved payload capacity, improved speed and range, 
improved day/night vision and targeting sensors, and will soon have manned/unmanned 
teaming ability.16 
To meet a broader spectrum of missions within the context of the Apaches role as 
a Close Combat Attack (CCA) aircraft, it can be configured in multiple variations using 
the customizable weapons loading attached to hard point connections and interfaces on 
the stub-wings. Weapons systems typically include, in varying amounts; Hellfire 
Missiles, Hydra 70 Aerial Rockets and 30 mm rounds for the nose turret mounted Chain 
Gun. Additional systems may include Stinger or AIM-9 air-to-air missiles, Sidearm anti-
radiation missiles, or external fuel tanks.17 
The Apache is a proven weapon system with top in its class capabilities. 
Operational successes include; extensive deployment to Operation Desert Storm where 
they destroyed key Iraqi anti-aircraft detection systems and nearly 300 enemy tanks, key 
roles in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s, and continued persistent operations in 
Afghanistan since 2001. 
                                                 
15 Wikipedia, s.v. “Boeing AH-64 Apache,” last modified September 14, 2014. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_AH-64_Apache. 




2. Program Description 
The Apache is an ACAT I program, managed by PM-AH (Attack Helicopter), 
under PEO Aviation at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville Alabama. The first helicopter 
rolled off the Mesa Arizona based Hughes Helicopter facility floor in 1983. By 1997, 
Hughes Helicopter had been bought by McDonnell Douglas and then merged to become 
part of The Boeing Company. Original versions of the AH-64A were costing the Army 
about $7M flyaway and about $13.9 in Per Unit Average Costs18. The Defense 
Acquisition Board (DAB) approved the development of an upgraded Apache, the AH-
64D Longbow which included the addition of the mast mounted Millimeter Microwave 
Radar Identification and Targeting System along with several other upgrades that, after a 
head to head evaluation, were demonstrated to have a 700% survivability increase and a 
400% lethality increase19. Full Rate Production of the Longbow Apache was approved in 
1996 with a target production total of 232 AH-64Ds. 
3. International Involvement 
The Apache is produced, tested, operated and supported with international 
involvement throughout. Various aerospace firms from around the world produce 
components of the Apache for Boeing. One of the largest is AgustaWestland, an Italian 
and United Kingdom merged company, builds several components for the Boeing 
produced variant and for a British Army Apache variant. This British variant is known as 
the AgustaWestland Apache and is assembled from kits purchased from Boeing under 
export license. The kit is based on the AH-64D Block I but has changes that support 
operation from Royal Navy vessels including more powerful engines, and folding rotor 
blades. The United Kingdom also maintains a Cooperative Development agreement with 
the U.S. where new technology development can be cost/benefit shared between both 
governments. This includes CET and FCT where test efforts, data and evaluations are 
shared. Korea Aerospace Industries is currently the sole manufacturer of the fuselage for 
the entire Apache production effort. Both the AH-64A and the AH-64D have been sold 
                                                 




as-is or modified and exported to a long list of foreign governments through either FMS 
and/or DCS20. A recent look at Wikipedia revealed that 13 countries, besides the U.S. 
and U.K. operate the Apache helicopter currently or are planning to in the near future 
including; Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and United Arab Emirates. 
Various country specific configurations are typically accommodated for on the 
production line, or through post-delivery installation/integration of unique subsystems 
such as communication suites, Radar, Missile, Laser, or Infrared threat detection systems. 
This process has similarities to current automobile manufacturing in that various options 
can be added or omitted during the production process to tailor the final production unit 
for the specific customer.  
Foreign access to computer source code is highly restricted, which limits the 
ability for other countries to develop new subsystems that would need to interoperate 
with the Apache’s operating systems main interface backbone, the 1553 Bus. In modern 
aviation systems, almost all electronic systems interface with the Bus. Not having the 
ability to independently develop unique subsystems that can be fully integrated into the 
Apache has caused concern with several foreign governments. 
4. SWOT 
Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as they pertain to the Apache 
program level of international consideration in the areas of cost, schedule and 
performance is as follows: 
 Strengths: 
 Cost: Enables reduced per unit costs due to increased quantity buys 
 Schedule: Provides additional stability to production schedule with 
ability to maintain optimum production rate 
 Performance: Additional capabilities developed and tested through 
the Cooperative Development Agreement are cost and risk shared. 
This allows for potential system performance improvement that 
                                                 
20 Wikipedia, s.v. “Boeing AH-64 Apache,” last modified September 14, 2014. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_AH-64_Apache. 
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otherwise may not be affordable. The additional firepower and war 
fighting capability of the Apache being distributed to our Allies 
has increased the lethality of the total Coalition. Internationally 
shared systems and support infrastructure can result in an overall 
reduced life cycle sustainment cost for all users 
 Weaknesses: 
 Cost: PMO staffing is required to be maintained at a higher level to 
support ongoing CD/FMS, and to a minimal extent, the DCS 
efforts. Failure of FMS agreements to be executed after the 
budgeting process causes a potential double hit to per unit cost 
 Schedule: Higher than expected demand by FMS and/or DCS 
could place U.S. Apache schedule at risk due to competing 
demands on the production line 
 Performance: Added complexity to an already complex platform 
 Opportunities: 
 Cost: Continued FMS/DCS efforts can potentially improve 
economies of scale and result in further per unit cost of the 
Apache. FMS sales can potential offset cost of future purchase of 
upgraded Apaches for the U.S. Army fleet 
 Schedule: International purchases could provide opportunities for 
schedule flexibility and allow better managing of long term 
production rates 
 Performance: Increase user base can potential reveal opportunities 
for performance improvement. Increase international partnerships 
open opportunities for foreign technology that otherwise may not 
be available 
 Threats: 
 Cost: Uncertainty of Foreign Country commitments, coupled with 
U.S. funds programming lead time creates cost risk and/or quantity 
of procurement risk 
 Schedule: Potential for international cooperation/FMS/DCS adds 
criticality to the Apache Program Protection Plan and requires 
additional scrutiny with Information Assurance concerns. This 
potentially puts risk on the schedule 
 Performance: Certain technologies may not get integrated on or 
into the Apache due to concern about exportability of the overall 
system. Some potential performance improvement opportunities 
could be sacrificed to maintain attractiveness to the foreign market 
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G. OTHER PROGRAM EXAMPLES 
The programs and systems discussed above are just a few examples of when and 
where international consideration can occur in an acquisition life cycle. There are 
numerous examples of early consideration such as the Multifunctional Information 
Distribution System (MIDS), advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) and the Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) where international consideration and partnerships were included at 
the inception. An example of international consideration after conception is the Mobile 
User Objective System (MUOS) and the plans for a coalition waveform via a cooperative 
program among several nations. Too numerous to mention are the programs that do not 
take international military partners into consideration due to barriers such as Information 




A. ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM RESEARCH 
In the previous chapter, five  DOD programs were examined to determine their 
individual strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats pertaining to the level of 
international consideration in their acquisition cycles. Examples of programs that 
considered international requirements early included GCCS-J and Apache. Examples of 
programs that began as domestic-only and branched out to the international component 
included the F/A-18 and GCCS-M programs. Finally, the ATNAVICS program was 
examined as an example of a program that could not capitalized on international 
consideration. The following list summarizes the programs research by name, ACAT and 
service capability.  
 GCCS-J–ACAT 1 Joint Command and Control System 
 GCCS-M –ACAT 1 Navy Command and Control System  
 F/A-18–ACAT 1 Navy Platform 
 ATNAVICS–ACAT III Army Air Traffic Service 
 Apache–ACAT I Army Platform 
1. SWOT Comparison 
Table 2, located at the end of this section, presents the SWOT information from 
Chapter IV in a format that compares the SWOT elements; cost, schedule and 
performance side-by-side for all five programs. 
a. Cost SWOT Comparison 
Cost strength similarities among programs include cost sharing for both services 
and per unit costs. Cost weakness similarities among programs include added program 
complexity requiring additional cost and potential problem of timing alignment for 
domestic and international budget actions. Cost opportunity similarities among programs 
include program diversification for the potential benefit of economies of scale, industry 
base support and cost sharing. Cost threat similarities among programs include increased 
cost risk due to unaligned schedules and changing or uncertain international 
 38 
requirements. The differences among the programs researched in cost SWOT occurred in 
the GCCS-M program whose decision as a program office to defer the international work 
to other organizations and with ATNAVICS as a result of using non-releasable NDI in 
the solution.  
b. Schedule SWOT Comparison 
Schedule strength similarities among programs include reuse of domestic 
baselines to reduce development schedules, schedule alignments and production line 
stability. Schedule weakness similarities among programs include the increased 
complexity and risk as a result of added international stakeholders. Schedule opportunity 
similarities among programs include schedule alignment and production stability. 
Schedule threat similarities among programs include added complexity risk and 
competing schedules resulting in delays to domestic and/or international timing 
requirements. The differences among the programs researched in schedule SWOT again 
were with GCCS-M and in most areas benefited the program due to a decrease in risk due 
to few stakeholders than the programs when compared to the programs who considered 
international requirements. Another difference noted was with the major platform 
programs and the production stability benefits due to the inclusion of international 
procurements. 
c. Performance SWOT Comparison 
Performance strength similarities among programs include the potential for 
reduced life cycle sustainment cost for all users and the added international stakeholder 
requirements potentially broaden innovation and capability set. Performance weakness 
similarities among programs include added complexity that increases risk in performance 
and the potential for competing requirements that force undesirable tradeoffs. 
Performance opportunity similarities among programs include increased user base, 
opening new doors in DOD acquisition to meet and utilize international capability 
requirements and increased interoperability and support infrastructure with allies. 
Performance threat similarities among programs include information assurance concerns, 
release and exportability barriers. Some differences among the programs researched in 
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performance SWOT were revealed in GCCS-M and ATNAVICS as a result of those 
programs not involving the international component. Potential opportunities to capitalize 
on the international influence on possible performance enhancements were differed by 
the PO due to competing priorities. Another difference was the limited interoperability 
testing opportunities for the C2 systems as a result of coordination complexity.  
2. SWOT Analysis 
Similarities and differences across cost, schedule and performance supported the 
premise of this research in that when the opportunity exists to consider international 
requirements the program may be able to benefit. The key however, is the ability to 
manage the additional risk of added complexity and increased number of stakeholders 
that international consideration brings to the process. Timing, as it pertains to 
requirement identification, budget cycles and delivery schedules all have to align as much 
as possible on both sides in order to effectively control the risk.  On top of this, domestic 
priorities and releaseability can both play a limiting factor even when everything is 
aligned. GCCS-M is a good example where the domestic and international alignment 
may have been too far apart for the PO to consider the potential and still meet their 
domestic priorities. The barrier that the ATNAVICS system hit was with releaseability of 
NDI which resulted in a nonstarter for international consideration.  
Risk acceptance and mitigation in order to leverage international requirements 
and resources need to be weighed individually by each program. Quantifiable evidence 
such as actual schedule metrics and budget data were not available for this research effort 
due to accessibility constraints. However, data such as cost and budget metrics for 
international consideration should be available internally to most program offices to aid 
in the decision to pursue or not to pursue. 
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Table 2.   SWOT Comparison for Cost, Schedule and Performance 
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Program Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
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3. Process for FMS/CP Engagement 
International consideration can be either a proactive or reactive task. If the 
capability that a PO is developing or producing is well established, then interested 
stakeholders can make availability inquiries through the normal channels. Those normal 
channels involve foreign partner requests through the COCOMs and/or Embassy Teams, 
to DSCA and service’s international program office (IPO), such as NIPO or USASAC 
and then to the respective PO. If, however, the capability is not as well-known and the 
PO wants to reach out to see if there is international interest, then there are several 
avenues of engagement. The most direct way is to communicate directly with the 
COCOM that uses or will use the capability. The COCOMs and their service component 
commands work directly with the allied nations within their areas of responsibility and 
are one of the best sources for interoperability requirements. Official requests from the 
partner nations would go through the normal channels described above if any interest is 
gathered. 
Another path is for the PO to approach their particular service’s IPO such as 
NIPO or USASAC.  The IPOs are the clearing house for incoming requests and know 
exactly what is being sold and to whom. They also have an understanding of capability 
gaps and trend analysis within the COCOMs and the service component commands 
within each COCOM. The IPOs can be used as a starting point for any level of 
international consideration from FMS to cooperative development.  
Aside from actual engagement, coalition references within the National Security 
Strategy, National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategies can give insight 
on international priorities. Such strategic alignments can influence the Joint Capabilities 
Integration Development System (JCIDS), the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution process (PPBE) and ultimately the acquisition of defense capabilities. DSCA is 
also an avenue to determine what types of services and capabilities are being purchased 
and developed for/with international partners. Internally, program offices can look to 
their PEOs and Science and Technology communities for opportunities identified in 
technical gap analysis projects. This can be helpful in understanding where coalition gaps 
exist or where materializing international requirements may fill domestic gaps. 
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4. Entry Points in Defense Acquisition Cycle 
In contrast to what may be a typical international involvement philosophy of; 
“Let’s build what we need and hope some foreign government will want to buy it” full 
consideration should include a spectrum of programs that start at the very earliest stages 
of the Acquisition process. Failure to involve particular international projects early may 
not preclude later involvement of other projects but, just like service unique domestic 
efforts, later additions of stakeholders and requirements almost always drive up cost and 
extend schedules at an increasing rate.  
a. Early Acquisition 
In the earliest stages of an acquisition effort, during the Materiel Solution 
Analysis phase, studies, exchanges of engineers and scientists and participation in the 
proper international forums will help harmonize requirements with potential international 
partners. These efforts may also lead to discovery of technology and resources available 
from international sources that would otherwise be overlooked. Gap analysis is the root 
of requirements development, but partial gap understanding will usually lead to 
incomplete requirements establishment. This sets the foundation for requirements creep 
later in the program.  
 
Figure 2.  Materiel Solution Analysis 
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b. Middle Acquisition 
Two acquisition phases make up the majority of system development; Technology 
Maturation & Risk Reduction, and Engineering & Manufacturing Development. In 
addition to leveraging and maintaining the efforts established in the previous phase, a 
program office could consider; cooperative research, cooperative development, foreign 
cooperative testing, and no cost loans of equipment for RDT&E.  
System specific requirements are firmed up during the TM-RR phase with outputs 
being the Capabilities Development Document, the Technology Readiness Assessment, 
the Cost Estimates and all other Milestone B documentation. This phase is the ideal place 
to consider inclusion of international requirements, especially as they relate to 
Information Assurance, Critical Protected Information, and the ability to export the 
system. 
Once the U.S. establishes valid User Requirement, the use of Foreign 
Comparative Testing opens the possibility to consider a foreign system to fulfill the gap. 
If a NDI foreign system is put through FCT and meets the requirements suitably and 
effectively, it would have priority over the development of a new system. This 
opportunity should be explored early in the acquisition process as it has the potential to 
shorten the entire process and save large amounts of development cost. 
 
Figure 3.  Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction 
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As the system development progresses through the engineering & manufacturing 
development (EMD) phase, the design is brought to near finalization and the 
manufacturing and integration of the subsystems and systems begins. Developmental 
testing and requirements validation occurs, which is the appropriate activity have 
integrated with established international partners. Schedules can be reduced and costs can 
be shared with the use of; cooperative development, foreign cooperative testing and the 
no cost loan of equipment for RDT&E efforts. Full cooperative leveraging at this phase 
has the potential to reduce or eliminate costly changes later in the acquisition effort.  
Once a decision has been made to develop a new system, FCT may still be a 
viable option when considering potential selection of NDI subsystems and/or 
components. At this point in the process full system FCT may not be an option but 
proportional savings of cost and schedule are still possible by using foreign items that 
meet the need. 
International efforts from earlier phases of the program may still be appropriate, 
such as international forums, engineers and scientist exchanges and studies. Many 
programs delay some requirements to follow-on increments or post deployment upgrade 
efforts for one reason or another. Studies and other research type efforts during this phase 
will help later integration of those delayed capabilities. 
 
Figure 4.  Engineering & Manufacturing Development 
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c. Late Acquisition 
The final two phases of the Acquisition process begin with Milestone C and 
continue until the end of life (EOL) or disposal of the system. Initial Production and 
Operational Testing usually occur between the Milestone C decision and the full rate 
production (FRP) decision. Initial operational testing and evaluation (IOT&E) is the 
critical capstone of the development and production effort where independent testing is 
done by actual operators. Failure at this point often means significant schedule slip to fix 
identified errors or even program cancellation. If international partners are involved at 
this point, it would be highly advantageous to share resources, data, facilities and 
evaluation effort related to the IOT&E, which is the purpose of the foreign cooperative 
testing program. The use of no cost equipment loans for RDT&E would also cover any 
foreign need to conduct independent T&E to satisfy unique foreign country requirements, 
threats, environments or support infrastructures.  
 
Figure 5.  Initial Production and Operational Testing 
It is worth noting that all of the phases leading up to this point are void of FMS 
and DCS. Program Managers involved with the early stages of acquisition considering 
the appropriate international involvement should ask their team “If we don’t consider 
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international cooperation now, can we afford to wait until after FRP to get an FMS case 
or let the contractor get DCS exports approved?” It is only during this final acquisition 
phase that FMC/DCS cases are approved without significant waivers from DOD and 
Congress. On the other hand, every international program conducted up to this point 
remains a valid consideration for continuation through this remaining phase. Some efforts 
are likely ramped down significantly, especially if this is the final or only increment of 
the development effort. 
 
Figure 6.  Production, Operations & Support 
B. BARRIERS 
Several barriers exist to impede International involvement in the Acquisition 
Community, some real and some perceived. Part of the intent of this paper is to help 
clarify the understanding of the international cooperation efforts and as a result reduce 
many of the perceived barriers. The real barriers are not as simple to reduce, but take 
determined effort, early consideration and advanced planning to overcome.  
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1. Security 
A quote from the International Programs Security Handbook, chapter 8 “Systems 
Acquisition and Program Security Documents” puts security considerations in good 
perspective. 
Past practice, the need for the best technologies available, and economic 
considerations suggest some involvement by allied and other friendly 
nations may occur in all but the most sensitive acquisition programs. 
Cooperation may be in the form of cooperative research &development 
(R&D), the use of foreign contractors and subcontractors, direct 
commercial sales (DCS), foreign military sales (FMS), or follow-on 
support. Realistically, there are very few defense articles the United States 
will not sell or share with an ally sometime during the life cycle of the 
article. Therefore, planning for some form of foreign participation must 
start early in the acquisition process. A key aspect of this planning 
involves decisions on access to classified information and critical 
unclassified technical data and the protection of system capabilities and 
vulnerabilities, which are based on the underlying technology.21 
Dealing with the challenges of IA, including control of critical protection 
information (CPI), classified information and critical unclassified technical data can be a 
daunting task for the PM staff to tackle in a domestic program. Add the complexity of 
international involvement and it becomes an obvious barrier. The best way to break down 
this barrier is to incorporate the direct support of knowledgeable International Program 
and/or FMS experts on the integrated process/product team (IPT). As a second 
alternative, identify competent existing members of the IPT who can attend training to 
become knowledgeable advisors. Guidance is abundant and a good place to start is the 
International Programs Security Handbook. To re-emphasize the quote, the key is to start 
early in the acquisition process. Doing this has the potential to eliminate latent 
symptomatic “barriers” such as these examples: 
 Attempting to integrate U.S. systems with a foreign government managed 
network with incompatible security, or security measure that were not 
properly verified, tested or monitored. 
                                                 
21 Under Secretary of Defense Technology Security Policy & National Disclosure Policy. 
International Programs Security Handbook, Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense, 2010. 
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 Selecting components or subsystems that have unnecessarily high security 
classifications for the application which results in excessive limitations on 
international cooperation, FMS or DCS. 
 Upgrades developed that “break” international interoperability or 
exportability. 
2. Expectation Challenges 
Cultural differences may also cause friction or misunderstandings. The U.S. DOD 
Acquisition systems is complex, slow to respond, and in all but the most urgently needed 
efforts, anything but agile. This can be very frustrating, not only from the inside looking 
out, but from the outside looking in. U.S. Program Managers may have international 
opportunities that present themselves but never materialize simply due to the bureaucratic 
challenges. This combined with language and cultural barriers can lead to differing 
expectations if not carefully coordinated amongst all stakeholders. 
3. Implied/Actual Added Cost in Future International Engagements 
Cost stability and quantity purchase discounts are sought after benefits of Joint 
and International participation. These can sometimes be illusive in execution due to 
shifting budget priorities of both countries, escalating costs during development and early 
production, or poor cost estimating that all drive participating countries to either back out 
of participation or reduce the desired quantities. This causes second order impacts of 
further cost increases of the remaining quantities purchased by the U.S. It does not take 
many instances like this to make a PM think twice before entering into an International 
Agreement. 
4. U.S. Priorities 
The tendency of most PMs is to not only put the U.S. priorities at the top of the 
list, but also put their own service priorities up there too. The culture and reward structure 
of the DOD supports the continuation of this trend.  
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C. CURRENT ATMOSPHERE 
The atmosphere for international consideration is currently very active and 
involves the U.S. DOD but also U.S. industry and the international defense community. 
Under severe national financial pressure, the U.S. DOD is experiencing declining budgets 
and significant reductions in military involvement in both the Iraq and Afghanistan 
campaigns. As a result of this, program offices are faced with funding cuts, increased 
scrutiny over justification and even program cancelations. International involvement can 
offer additional opportunities to help offset some of these negative impacts if it can be 
aligned with what remains of the domestic cost, schedule and performance objectives. On 
the negative side of the consideration though, if a program has to stop mid-effort to 
consider international cooperation or FMS, the additional delay, cost or performance 
changes may be enough to drop the program below the “Cut Line” of the priorities list.  
The recent increase in USG participation at the 2014 Farnborough Air Show has 
indicated a renewed interest in supporting the U.S. Industrial base in this forum as well as 
meeting with other international partners and gaining exposure to new technologies as 
Aaron Mehta noted in the Defense News article on July 19, 2014. U.S. DOD Industries 
also realize this and are leading the charge in international engagement opportunities. 
Their future may depend on them diversifying into the international defense arena to help 
offset the declines in the U.S. DOD budgets. As stated by the Chief Executive Officer of 
the U.S. Aerospace Industries Association, Marion Blakey during an interview with 
Aaron Mehta at the Farnborough Air Show: “International sales normally form the 
backbone of interoperability with our friends and allies, as well as helping to keep pricing 
and costs down and manufacturing lines open. In a constrained domestic budget 
environment, our member companies increasingly are turning to the international 
market.” 
The recent Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0 has also placed emphasis on including 
defense exportability features early in the design process. Under the focus area “Control 
Costs Throughout the Product Life cycle,” this initiative is one of 36 under seven focus 
areas to “ensure affordability and increase productivity in defense spending to deliver 
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better value to the taxpayer and Warfighter”.22 Benefits highlighted in this initiative 
include reduced cost, improved U.S. competitiveness, stronger ties to friends and allies, 
and improved interoperability.23 
With reductions in the U.S. DOD budget and reductions in military involvement, 
the international defense community is also seeking ways to continue to build their own 
capability. Either directly with industry in DCS with the U.S. or other nations in FMS, 
they have a strong demand for services and rapidly delivered capabilities. Both the USG 
and the U.S. DOD industrial base stand a good chance of capitalizing on this increased 
demand if the international resources exist and if alignment can be accomplished between 
all three. 
                                                 
22 F. Kendall, Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending [Memorandum]. (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (AT&L), November 13, 2012). 
23 F. Kendall, Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending [Memorandum]. (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (AT&L), November 13, 2012). 
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
In Chapter I, several questions were posed in an attempt to investigate if the 
utilization of U.S. interoperability requirements of our foreign allies could enhance 
expand and potentially reduce the cost of our domestically acquired capabilities. To 
answer these questions a high level overview of International Armament Cooperation 
was presented to explain the foundation and the tie-ins to the DAS. From there, a 
stakeholder analysis was presented to form the basis of expectations when working 
within IAC and its overlap with the DAS. Finally, several program examples were 
provided and analyzed to show examples of early, middle, late or no international 
consideration.  
The first question dealt directly with determining if early and continuous 
consideration of foreign interoperability requirements within domestic DOD acquisitions 
can benefit the United States Armed Forces acquisitions in terms of cost, schedule and 
performance. Here, alignment and performance are the keys to success. Cost and 
Schedule known and unknowns will almost certainly increase, however if they can be 
aligned with both the domestic and international expectations as much as possible the 
overall burden and risk to the PO may be reduced. From the performance perspective, 
interoperability, increased coalition performance, and increased industrial base are the 
consistent pay-outs of international participation.  
The second question posed placed emphasis on how a domestic Program Office 
would determine if foreign interoperability requirements exist for their product(s) and/or 
service(s). Early stakeholder engagement and participation in international forums, 
exchanges of engineers and scientists, and use of the information exchange programs 
early in the acquisition process are keys to success in this area. These opportunities 
should be done preferably during the Solution Analysis phase, but at least during the TM-
RR phase. 
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Finally, the third question required an exploration of process to help a PM 
determine how to implement foreign interoperability requirements into their product(s) 
and/or service(s). To accomplish this, a description of the full spectrum of 
IAC/FMS/DCS, the appropriate entry points, barriers and rewards was provided. The 
intent of this description was to help establish that direct involvement of International 
Program/FMS/DCS SME’s in the IPT early and continuously is possible throughout the 
Acquisition process. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Increase the DOD International Program and Foreign Military Sales 
Staffing 
Program Managers and IPTs need access to staff that is skilled in IP, IC, FMS and 
DCS at every stage of the acquisition life cycle. Early and thorough analysis of the 
benefits and costs of using the appropriate mix of security cooperation is critical to enable 
the opportunities at later stages. Poorly informed decisions early can result in derailing 
attempts to integrate an international effort in subsequent phases. The current DOD 
staffing appears to be biased toward FMS and DCS and maybe insufficient to support the 
remainder of the possibilities except in only the largest ACAT-I programs. 
There are at least two methods to accomplish this recommendation. First, 
dedicated staff could be increased for IP support that would allow for more matrixed type 
support of the PM and IPTs. Second, current staff from other competencies could assume 
additional responsibilities of becoming more knowledgeable in the cooperative program 
efforts. The proficiency could be enhanced through temporary rotational assignments 
after appropriate coursework. The ultimate end result should be a much larger workforce 
competent in international efforts and available to support the acquisition process at all 
stages. 
2. In-depth Analysis of the Joint Strike Fighter Program 
Recommend future research on the Joint Strike Fighter program as an example of 
a cooperative development program in its Initial Production and Operational Testing 
phase. 
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The Joint Strike Fighter program is a very complex program with numerous 
countries involved in the design and manufacturing processes and a very large population 
of stakeholders that span the spectrum from operational users in every service through 
elected officials that represent over 30 States. As the program makes it way to 
Production, Operations & Support, there may be many lessons learned regarding the 
program’s effects, both positive and negative, on cost sharing, economies of scale and 
quicker implementation times.   
C. CONCLUSION 
While only touching the surface on DOD acquisition program examples and 
limiting the research to what was publically available a conclusion can be drawn that 
when domestic and international cost, schedule and performance requirements align, 
opportunities to leverage can exist.  Barriers, however, must be considered since they 
could ultimately increase risk and cause misalignment. Ultimately it is in our National 
interest for U.S. DOD Program Offices and their PM’s to consider our international 
partnerships to help enhance, expand and potentially reduce the cost of our domestically 
acquired capabilities. This is in conjunction with the opportunity to better equip our allies 








The following tables are consolidated listings of SA programs and SC programs. 
The governing documents that apply to each program are listed in Table 3 for the SA 
programs. None are listed in Table 4, as all SC programs are authorized by the National 
Defense Authorizations and Appropriations Acts and are all managed by DOD. 
Table 3.   Security Assistance Programs24 
Program Oversight Purpose Governing Document 
Foreign Military Sales DSCA Eligible foreign governments 
purchase U.S. Defense articles, 
services and training. 
AECA Section 21: Items 
from existing stock 
AECA Section 22: Items 
from new procurement 
Foreign Military 
Construction Services 
DSCA Sale of design and construction 
service to eligible purchasers 
AECA Section 29 
Foreign Military 
Financing Program 
DSCA Provides grants and loans which 
enable eligible foreign 
governments to purchase U.S. 
defense articles, services, and 
training. 
AECA Section 23 & 24 
Leases DSCA Allows the lease of defense 
articles only for compelling 
foreign policy or national security 
reasons. 
AECA Chapter 6 AECA 
Military Assistance 
Program 
DSCA Merged with the FMFP program 
in 1990. Remains an open 
program only to track open 





DSCA Provides grant financial 
assistance of training in the U.S. 
and, in some cases, overseas 
facilities to selected foreign 
military and civilian personnel. 
FAA Section 541 
FAA section 644(m)(5) 
AECA Section 
21(a)(1)(C) 
Expanded IMET DSCA Focuses training on developing 
professional level management 
skills with emphasis on military 
justice systems, codes of conduct, 
and the protection of human 
rights. 
FAA Section 541 
FAA section 644(m)(5) 
AECA Section 
21(a)(1)(C) 
                                                 
24 Derived from Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security 
Cooperation (Green Book), 33
rd
 ed. (Write-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Defense Institute of Security 
Assistance Management, 2014), (1-1–1-6). 
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Program Oversight Purpose Governing Document 
Drawdowns DSCA  Provide USG articles, services 
and training to friendly countries 
and international organizations at 
no cost during a crisis 
FAA section 506 
FAA section 552©(2) 
Economic Support 
Fund 
USAID Promote economic and political 
stability in areas where the U.S. 
has special political and security 
interest and where the U.S. has 
determined that economic 
assistance can be useful in 
helping to secure peace or to avert 
major economic or political 
crises. 
FAA Chapter 4 of part II 
Peacekeeping 
Operations 
DOS Provides funds for Multinational 
Force and Observers and support 
of peacekeeping efforts where 
necessary. 







The current principal 
Peacekeeping Operations 
program. Supports deployment of 
peacekeepers by providing 
equipment, transportation, 




Control and Law 
Enforcement (INCLE) 
DOS Suppress the worldwide illicit 
manufacture and trafficking of 
narcotic and psychotropic drugs, 
money laundering, and precursor 
chemical diversion and the 
progressive elimination of the 
illicit cultivation of the applicable 
crops. 





DOS Supports demining activities, the 
clearance of unexploded 
ordnance, the destruction of small 
arms, border security, and related 
activities. Related articles, 
services and training can also be 
provided. 
FAA part II, chapters 8 & 
9 
AECA Section 23 







Commercial exports of defense 
articles, services and training. 
AECA section 38 
ITAR [22 CFR 120–130] 
Excess Defense 
Articles 
DOD Excess defense articles are 
authorized for sale using the FMS 
processes. 
AECA section 21 
FAA section 516 
Third Country 
Transfers 
DOS Transfer U.S.-origin defense 
articles from the original recipient 
country to a third country. 
AECA section 3(d) 
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Table 4.   Security Cooperation Programs25 
Program Purpose 
Security Assistance 
Administered by DOD 
Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Services, 
Foreign Military Financing Program, Leases, Military Assistance 
Program, International Military Education and Training, 
Drawdowns, Excess Defense Articles when administered by DOD.  
Global Train and Equip Currently about 18 programs that Train and/or Equip Foreign 
Security and/or Military Forces. 
International Armaments 
Cooperation 
Also known as simply International Cooperation. Includes: 
Information Exchange Program, Exchange of Engineers & 
Scientists, Foreign Comparative Testing, Cooperative RDT&E and 
Production, No-Cost Equipment Loans, Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program, Israeli Cooperative Programs, International Air 
and Trade Shows, Humanitarian Assistance,  
Humanitarian Assistance Humanitarian and Civic Action during Military Operations, 
Humanitarian Assistance Transportation, Foreign Disaster Relief, 
Humanitarian Daily Rations, Excess Property Humanitarian 
Assistance, Humanitarian Demining Assistance, Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program, Reintegration Activities in 
Afghanistan, Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund 
Training and Education Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, DOD 
Regional Centers for Security Studies, Military Academies, Military 
Academy Student Exchanges, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, 
Electronic Distribution of Training Material, Aviation Leadership 
program, Latin America Training Waiver, Distinguished Visitor 
Orientation Tours, Professional Military Education Student 
Exchanges, Flight Student Exchanges, Flight Leadership Training in 
Southwest Asia, unit Exchanged training, Air Force partnership for 
Peace Scholarship 
Combined Exercises Exercises between the forces of the U.S. and those of one or more 
other countries. The primary purpose is the training of the U.S. 
forces, emphasizing interoperability and capability building. 
Military-to-Military 
Contacts 
M2M contacts and comparable activities that are designed to 
encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and 
military forces of other countries. 
                                                 
25 Derived from Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security 
Cooperation (Green Book), 33
rd
 ed. (Write-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Defense Institute of Security 
Assistance Management, 2014), (1-7–1-26). 
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